I. Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007 has drawn attention to the role played by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), in its causes. Chartered by Congress during the Great Depression, Fannie Mae was the first of the GSEs to come into existence. Charged with increasing the liquidity of mortgage credit and providing stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages, Fannie evolved over the years from an institution that only purchased FHA-insured mortgages to one that also purchased conforming and conventional, non-federally insured mortgages. By acquiring mortgages and, starting in 1981, securitizing them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), Fannie could transfer default risk from the originator's books onto its own and in the process encourage further mortgage lending.
Though the federal government removed its explicit guarantee of Fannie's debt in 1954, fully privatized the GSE in 1968, and consequently took it off its balance sheet, the GSE still retained what has become known as an implied government guarantee of its debt. Because of Fannie's historical ties to the government, exemption from state and local taxes, low capital requirements, and ability to borrow directly from the Treasury, investors perceived that the government would stand behind it in the event of financial trouble. In 1970, Freddie was created with the same special treatment and implied guarantee. As a result, both GSEs could issue corporate bonds at considerably lower cost than competing private financial institutions. 1 The MBS that they packaged, guaranteed, and sold to investors also benefited from the implied government guarantee. Capital regulations encouraged banks to sell their mortgages to the GSEs and buy back the resulting MBS. While the banks were required to have a minimum of 4 cents of capital for every dollar worth of mortgages on their balance sheets, they would need to have only 1.6 cents of capital on hand for every dollar worth of agency MBS in their possession (Acharya et al., 2011) . In turn, the GSEs were required to hold a minimum of 45 basis points of capital against credit risk, so that 1 Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) estimate a 42 basis point GSE advantage on long-term debt and a 13 basis point advantage on short-term debt. Ambrose and Warga (2002) find the GSE advantage to be between 25 and 29 basis points over "AA" banking sector bonds; between 43 and 47 basis points over "A" bonds; and between 76 and 80 basis points over "BBB" bonds. The implied guarantee has allowed market participants to consider GSE debt as risk-free as Treasury securities (Acharya et al., 2011). mortgages securitized by the GSEs would have a total of 2.05 percent (1.6 percent for the bank and 0.45 percent for the GSE) of capital backing them as opposed to the 4 percent capital required to back whole loans held on banks' books (Hancock et al., 2006) . Though this rule permitted banks to focus on the origination and servicing of mortgages, rather than on managing their credit risk, it also increased leverage throughout the financial and mortgage sectors.
With cheap borrowing costs and such incentives, the GSEs were able to grow from firms that owned or guaranteed 7.1 percent of residential mortgage debt outstanding As market participants had correctly assumed, not only would GSE obligations be backed by the government, but the GSEs would also be permitted to continue operations while in conservatorship. The bailout has so far cost taxpayers over $150 billion, with Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates suggesting that the figure could more than double by 2019 (CBO, 2010) .
The typical mortgage guaranteed or purchased by the GSEs has evolved over time. Initially, the GSEs focused on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 80 percent or less and originated to borrowers with prime credit histories.
Later, they introduced LTV programs of 95, 97, and eventually 100 percent, as well as programs for borrowers with blemished credit records and little or no asset documentation (Roberts, 2010) . The AHGs consist of three goals, established with the intention of encouraging the GSEs to achieve their mission of increasing access to residential mortgage credit.
Each goal stipulates that a certain percentage of dwelling units financed by each GSE's purchases has to meet established criteria. To qualify towards the "Low and ModerateIncome Goal" (LMG), a dwelling unit has to be owned by a borrower(s) whose income is below the area median family income.
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To qualify for a "Special Affordable Goal" (SAG), a dwelling unit has to be owned by a borrower(s) whose income is below 60 percent of the area median family income, or who has an income that is below 80 percent of the area median and resides in a census tract with median family income below 80 percent of the area median. Finally, a dwelling unit will count towards the "Underserved Areas Goal" (UAG) if it is located in a census tract where the median family income is less than 90 percent of the area median family income, or if it is located in a tract with median family income less than 120 percent of the area median and where at least 30 percent of the population is a minority.
GSE performance on these goals was measured annually by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which up until 2008 was the agencies' prudential and mission regulator. Since the goals focused on the dwelling units financed by GSE purchases, the GSEs could get different amounts of goal "credit" for different kinds of purchases. A single-family mortgage purchase could help finance 1 to 4 dwelling units and thus yield 1 to 4 goal credits; multi-family mortgage purchases could yield 5 or more credits; and purchases of Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs), which included private-label MBS, could yield as many credits as the number of qualifying dwelling units financed by the mortgage pool.
5
By design, a purchase could count toward more than one goal, so that, for example, a mortgage to a very low-income borrower living in an underserved area could count toward all three goals. Additionally, goal definitions of low income, moderate income, and underserved areas were more 3 "Area" can be a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or a rural area. For the LMG, the area median family income is estimated annually by HUD. 4 The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), housed within HUD, was the prudential regulator until it was replaced by the independent Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in 2008. 5 The 1995 Final Rule, submitted by HUD and put into effect in 1996, allowed REMIC purchases to count toward the goals "as long as the underlying mortgages or mortgage-backed securities were not previously purchased or issued by the GSEs or otherwise would result in double counting" (Federal Register, 1995). closely tied with criteria used by HUD for its other housing programs than with definitions of U.S. poverty line income. 6 As the mission regulator, HUD was also responsible for periodically revising the goals. From 1996 to 2008, it consistently ratcheted them up in a way that saw the LMG increase by 40 percent, the SAG increase by 125 percent, and the UAG increase by 85 percent (see Table 1 ). The fact that this pattern overlaps with the timeline of the growth of the housing bubble has fueled arguments that the AHGs are at least in part to blame for the mortgage crisis (Roberts, 2010; Wallison, 2011) . Substantiated by the fact that the goals targeted low income individuals, by the large share of residential mortgage debt outstanding on GSE books in the lead-up to the crisis, and by the potential for moral hazard induced by implied government backing, this argument seems plausible.
If the AHGs did cause the GSEs to fund substantially more risky loans than they otherwise would have, the AHGs could have contributed to the mortgage credit bubble that ultimately led to the financial crisis. As mentioned earlier, there are three channels through which the GSEs could have responded to the AHGs: single-family mortgage purchases, multi-family mortgage purchases, and REMIC purchases. The analysis that follows looks only at the single-family mortgage channel, in large part because the data available on multi-family and REMIC channels is currently inadequate for a thorough causal analysis of the effect of the goals on those channels.
To see if a causal link between the goals and an increase in risky GSE purchasing activity does indeed exist, I employ HUD's GSE Public Use Data Base and its census tract-level data on all single-family mortgages purchased by the GSEs from 1993 to 2006.
I estimate the effect of one of the goals, the UAG, on GSE purchasing activity and, as is custom in the literature, use it as a proxy for the effect of the goals as a whole. Two approaches are used, both utilizing a regression discontinuity strategy: The first measures the UAG effect for targeted tracts over the period 1996-2002. The second measures the 6 The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) housing programs each require people to live in a census tract with median income of 80 percent or less than the area median income in order to qualify for their support. Other government programs, such as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), require the tract median income to be 60 percent or less than the area median income. According to HUD's former Assistant Secretary for Housing John Weicher, the poverty line median household income for a family of four has been between 40 and 45 percent of the national median household income since 1993 (Weicher, 2010) . The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of existing literature and Section 3 describes the data, methodology, and results for the two approaches. Section 5 concludes.
II. Literature Review
Existing literature has tackled the effects of the goals on the supply of mortgage credit to the poor and underserved in several different ways. Since the LMG targets individuals and the SAG also has a component that targets tracts with TM of 0.80 or below, it is difficult to isolate the effects of these two goals at the tract level. One criterion of the UAG, however, specifically targets tracts with a TM of 0.90 or below, allowing studies to isolate its effect by focusing on tracts whose TM is between 0.80 and 0.90 and comparing them with those above the TM = 0.90 cutoff.
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Using tract-level 1990 Census and 2000 Census data for controls and tract-level HMDA data on GSE purchases to measure the "intensity" of GSE activity in each tract, An et al. (2007) estimate the UAG effect on housing market outcomes from 1990 to 2000. They compare changes in the homeownership rate, the vacancy rate, and in median home values in tracts just below the TM cutoff (TM ≤ 0.90) with those just above the TM cutoff (TM > 0.90). Although their first-stage estimates suggest that "tracts targeted under the GSE affordable goals were little different from untargeted tracts with respect to housing market outcomes during the 1990s," their second-stage estimates, controlling for potential endogeneity of GSE mortgage purchasing activity (e.g., the GSEs might be purchasing more in tracts that have increasing home prices, homeownership rates, etc.), indicate that the UAG increased home prices and homeownership rates. An et al. (2007) , in addition to several other papers on this topic (Bostic and Gabriel, (2006) ; Gabriel and Rosenthal, (2008) ; An and Bostic, (2008) ), attempts to decrease the potential for omitted variable bias by using regression discontinuity analysis 8 The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which requires a TM of at most 0.60, and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, which requires a TM of at most 0.80, also make it difficult to isolate the AHG effect. 9 Recall that mortgage purchases can count towards more than one goal for the GSEs, suggesting that an analysis of the UAG effect on tracts with TM between 0.80 and 0.90 will also capture some of the effects of the other goals.
to compare tracts with TM 5 to 10 percentage points below the cutoff to tracts with TM 5 to 10 percentage points above the cutoff. However, none of these studies control for relative income within these ranges, assuming, for example, that a tract with TM of 0.80 is the same in the effect of people's income on GSE purchases as a tract with TM of 0.88, and potentially biasing their estimates of the UAG effect downward. An et al. (2007) 's first-stage estimates, which find that GSE market share is 12.8 percent lower in treatment versus control tracts, suggest that this downward bias is in fact present in these studies. Bostic and Gabriel (2006) also find generally negative and mostly statistically insignificant effects of the UAG on GSE purchasing intensity in California. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2008) report negative and statistically insignificant estimates and argue that GSE purchases crowd-out non-GSE purchases. An and Bostic (2008) conclude that credit supply and homeownership is "effectively unchanged" by the UAG. They posit that by improving lending conditions for those who would otherwise have to take out an FHAinsured loan with a high mortgage rate, the UAG left the FHA with the most risky borrowers, forced it to introduce stricter underwriting requirements, and decreased the number of FHA-insured mortgages originated. Thus, on net, they find credit supply in targeted tracts to be unchanged. Bhutta (2010) resolves this downward bias concern by controlling for each tract's TM and focusing his analysis of the UAG effect on tracts within 5 percentage points and 2 percentage points of the cutoff. Through a similar regression discontinuity analysis as performed by the studies above, Bhutta finds a 4 percent increase in GSE purchases in targeted tracts in the period 1997 to 2002 as a result of the UAG. Since previous work tried to assess the effect of the UAG not only on the number of GSE purchases in targeted tracts but also on changes in home prices, homeownership, and vacancy rates, among other things, it had to use detailed Census data that was only available at the tract level on a decennial basis. By focusing purely on GSE purchasing activity, Bhutta is able to go a step further. Measuring the change in GSE purchases for tracts that were not Bhutta's important work, however, has several limitations. His use of 1994 His use of -1996 as the pre-UAG control years is likely biasing his results downward. Although the goals did not go into effect until 1996, HUD set a preliminary UAG at 30 percent as early as 1993 (see Table 1 ). Moreover, my analysis of single-family GSE purchases from 1993 to 1995 shows that Fannie went from having 20.3 percent of its purchases meet the UAG in 1993 to 25.7 percent in 1995, while Freddie had a smaller increase from 19.4 percent in 1993 to 22.0 percent in 1995 (see Fig. 2 ). Assuming that mortgages that meet the UAG differ from the types of mortgages the GSEs normally want to accumulate (otherwise there would be no point to the goal!), these trends suggest that the GSEs were not thinking of the 30 percent UAG as purely preliminary. Thus, using 1993-95 or even 1993-94 as control years would help produce a more precise measurement of the UAG effect.
The biggest limitation in Bhutta's paper is the nature of the data that he uses. By employing HMDA data, like all of the other scholars mentioned above, he is unable to take GSE purchases of seasoned mortgages and mortgages not directly sold to the GSEs into account when carrying out his analyses. He thus observes fewer mortgages than the GSEs actually made and, depending on the distribution of these uncounted mortgages among the targeted and untargeted tracts, his results could be either biased upward or downward.
III. Data, Methodologies, Results
Publicly available data on GSE purchasing activity makes it difficult to assess the extent to which the GSEs met their goals. As mentioned earlier, a goal would be achieved if a certain share of all dwelling units financed by GSE purchases met the necessary criteria. HMDA data used by most of the existing literature denotes which single-family and multi-family mortgages were purchased by the GSEs, but does not provide the number of dwelling units financed by each mortgage. Data available through HUD's GSE Public Use Data Base is similarly limited, but unlike HMDA data it includes GSE purchases of seasoned mortgages and mortgages the GSEs do not purchase directly from originators.
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The absence of data on dwelling units thus forces any analysis on the effect of the goals on GSE purchasing activity to make simplifying assumptions. In the analysis that follows, a single-family mortgage is assumed to consist of 1 dwelling unit. It is worth noting that a similar simplification would be more difficult to make for multi-family mortgages, since the variance in dwelling units financed would be much larger. This trend, however, does not necessitate a causal relationship between the goals and GSE purchasing activity. Other factors, including other governmental housing programs and the perception that home prices can only rise, could have been driving the GSEs to purchase a larger share of products that qualified for the goals. Other factors may have brought high-risk borrowers into the mortgage market by perversely altering GSE purchasing activity or by working through non-GSE channels all together.
As mentioned earlier, I use HUD's GSE Public Use Data Base and regression discontinuity analysis to estimate the effect of the UAG and by proxy the goals as a whole on GSE purchasing activity. I focus solely on the first part of the UAG, where a tract is deemed eligible if its TM ≤ 0.90. The first approach measures the UAG effect for targeted tracts over the period 1996-2002. 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census data is used to control for tract and MSA-level characteristics. 12 10 Both data sets include data on home purchase and refinancing mortgages. 11 Although Fig. 2 does not show data for the SAG, the GSEs met or exceeded it through 2007 without exception. 12 GSE Public Use data was purchased from HUD using Stanford UAL Small Grant #4769. Decennial Census data was purchased from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce using the same UAL grant.
A. The UAG Effect, 1996-2002 I compiled a tract-level dataset that merges data on all single-family GSE purchases with 1990 Census data.
13 Table 2 reports summary statistics on tract-level controls. As in previous literature, I exclude non-MSA census tracts for reliability reasons and because it is not always possible to map a rural purchase to a specific tract. I also exclude observations based on the following exclusion criteria:
 Observations where either the state, county, MSA, or tract identifier is missing  Observations for which state, county, and tract identifiers in the GSE dataset did not match precisely with 1990 Census state, county, and tract codes  Observation where the borrower was listed as younger than 18 years old  Tracts in Hawaii and Alaska in order to avoid potentially idiosyncratic housing markets  Tracts formed between 1993 and 1999 so as to compare only tracts with unchanging geographical characteristics  Tracts that are split between MSAs (only in New England states)  Tracts with missing data on median income  Tracts that in 1990 had fewer than 100 housing units  Tracts that in 1990 had zero specified owner-occupied units  Tracts that in 1990 had more than 30% of the population living in group quarters (military barracks, dormitories, detention centers, etc.)  Tracts with an extremely high (>5) or low (<0.1) number of GSE purchases as a share of owner-occupied units (Bhutta (2010) excludes tracts where the number of originations as a share of owner-occupied units is >10 and <0.2. Since I only have data on GSEpurchased mortgages, I use the rule of thumb that the GSEs hold about half of all mortgage debt on their books in determining my extremely high and extremely low thresholds above).
When first delineated, census tracts are usually 2,500 to 8,000 persons in size and are designed to be "homogeneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions" (U.S. Census, 2000) . There are no restrictions on their spatial size, however, as long as they do not cross county lines.
As Table 2 shows, there is a virtually identical number of tracts and MSAs below and above the TM = 0.90 eligibility cutoff, whether we use the ± 0.05 or the ± 0.02 bandwidth around the cutoff. When it comes to the number of GSE purchases, however, tracts with 0.90 < TM ≤ 0.95 have a statistically significantly higher number of purchases per year than tracts with 0.85 ≤ TM < 0.90. When we use a ± 0.02 bandwidth around the cutoff, the number of purchases per year in the two groups is not statistically different.
This characteristic of the data suggests that it is important to control for income when using a ± 0.05 bandwidth around the cutoff, but is not necessary to do so when using a ± 0.02 bandwidth.
Methodology
The discontinuity in the applicability of the UAG at TM = 0.90 allows for a regression discontinuity analysis that compares the number of GSE purchases in tracts targeted and untargeted by the UAG. In its simplest form, the tract-level regression that we have to consider is as follows:
where Y i is the log number of GSE purchases in tract i,
] is the dummy variable that differentiates targeted from untargeted tracts, and ε i is the error term that captures the unmeasured effects on GSE purchasing activity. This specification assumes that, at the limit, ε is the same for tracts just below and just above the cutoff. Formally, we have:
where E is the expectation operator. Thus, if (2) holds, the coefficient β on the treatment dummy D i captures the UAG effect.
14 Several issues arise, however, with this simple estimation method. First, as studies like An et al. (2007) and Bhutta (2010) show, the number of originations in a tract is positively correlated with the TM of the tract, suggesting that our estimates of β in (1) will be downward biased as long as we do not control for TM. Additionally, looking at all tracts below the cutoff, in particular those with TM ≤ 0.80, will also confound the interpretation of β because other governmental housing programs will apply. To overcome these shortcomings and improve on the estimation methods of the preceding literature, I run my regressions for h = 0.02 and h = 0.05 rather than h = 0.10 or greater, and in the case of h=0.05 I also control for the relative TM.
Another problem with (1) is that it does not include tract-level covariates that capture significant differences between the two tract groups in housing and demographic characteristics. I include these covariates in some of my regressions (see Table 3 ) and also control for the number of GSE purchases in each tract prior to the introduction of the goals. As discussed earlier, my analysis of single-family GSE purchases prior to the introduction of the goals suggests that Bhutta's use of 1994-1996 as the pre-treatment years is likely biasing his estimate of β downward. To mitigate this potential bias, I use the log number of GSE purchases in 1993-1995 as the control for pre-treatment GSE activity.
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I run three sets of regressions as part of this analysis. In the first set, I estimate (3) and (4) which augment (1) with relevant controls. (3) introduces X i , a vector that includes the log number of owner-occupied units and the log number of total housing units. (4) adds Y i , a vector that includes all other housing and demographic covariates.
In addition, I introduce D
where M i is the minority share of the population living in tract i. 16 Thus, the coefficient β in regression (5) estimates the effect of the UAG based on both of its eligibility criteria.
The second set, typified by (6), includes TM' i = TM i -0.90 and the interaction variable (TM' i )*(D i ) which together provide an important control for TM differences relative to the cutoff.
The third set narrows the analysis down to h = 0.02 and includes a two-stage estimation procedure. Following Bhutta (2010) Since satisfying this criterion is clearly highly correlated with being UAG eligible and, controlling for TM, plausibly affects the number of GSE mortgage purchases in a given tract only through the UAG, it is arguably a good instrumental variable for this analysis.
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The first and second stage regressions are described in (7) and (8), respectively. In all regressions, I control for MSA effects by clustering standard errors at MSA-level.
Y i = α + βD
Results Table 3 reports coefficient estimates for the regressions described above, with the log number of GSE purchases for 1996-2002 as the dependent variable. Column 1 reports the coefficient on the treatment dummy when the bandwidth around the cutoff is h = 0.05 and only tract size controls are employed. The estimate indicates that tracts below the cutoff see almost 8 percent fewer GSE purchases than tracts above the cutoff, which is in line with the negative estimate on D i reported by An et al. (2007) and others.
Including other tract controls, column 2 shows untargeted tracts with still about 1.5 percent more GSE purchases than targeted tracts, although this estimate is no longer statistically significant. As discussed earlier, these results are most likely due to the fact that we are missing a control for income. Results in column 3 provide another reason why 17 Bhutta argues that D i is "plausibly exogenous given TM," while D * ' i is endogenous, although he does not specify his reasons for the endogeneity concern. From an omitted variable bias perspective, it is possible that surges in immigration of minorities to neighborhoods with minority levels just under 30 percent of the population are both making tracts eligible for the UAG and increasing the number of GSE purchases in those tracts purely through an increase in the demand for housing. In this sense, D i is plausibly exogenous, controlling for TM, because it is harder to imagine surges in movements of relatively poor non-minorities into neighborhoods that are just above the TM = 0.90 cutoff. 18 Bhutta also calculates the UAG effect using minority share of population = 0.30 as a discontinuity and finds "no substantive difference across the cutoff." 19 The first UAG criterion is a very strong instrument, with a first-stage t-statistic of 75.99. using D i is better than using the true treatment dummy variable, one that also includes tracts with minority share of population at or above 30 percent as long as their TM is less than or equal to 1.20. Combining these two eligibility criteria weakens the strength of the TM = 0.90 discontinuity by including targeted tracts between TM = 0.90 and TM = 0.95.
Given that the difference in the number of GSE purchases in targeted and untargeted tracts was negative in our earlier estimates, we would expect it to be even more negative now due to a UAG-induced increase in the number of GSE purchases in the tracts we considered untargeted before. The effect measured in column 3 is indeed lower by about 0.6 percent than the estimate in column 2, confirming our hypothesis. in GSE purchasing activity. The coefficient is very close to zero, however, and not statistically different from it, suggesting a negligible UAG effect on GSE purchases.
The regression represented in column 6 includes the log number of GSE purchases for 1993-1995 in each tract as a control for past GSE purchasing behavior.
Although expected to eliminate the downward bias on the coefficient on D i in Bhutta's regressions, the inclusion of this control shows the UAG effect at 1.4 percent versus Bhutta's 3 percent. Something else must clearly be at play in order for my estimate to be lower. Though Bhutta speculates that his estimate of the UAG effect would be even bigger if he were to include seasoned mortgage purchases in his analysis, he does not consider the possibility that these purchases would not be more heavily concentrated in targeted tracts. The fact that my data set includes these purchases, coupled with my lower UAG effect estimate, suggests that these purchases are distributed either in the same way as other GSE purchases or are more heavily concentrated in untargeted tracts.
Columns 7-9 reduce the bandwidth around the cutoff to h = 0.02 in order to capture the difference in GSE purchases for tracts that just qualified to those that just did not. Including all controls except for the control for GSE purchases for 1993-1995, we see an estimate on D i that is negative but very small and not statistically different from zero. The estimate in column 8, with the control for GSE purchases included, shows 1.1 percent more purchases in targeted tracts than in untargeted ones, while Bhutta reports a 3.3 percent difference in favor of targeted tracts.
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Employing the two-stage estimation procedure to correct for potential endogeneity bias, we get an estimate of a 2.7 percent UAG-effect, although it again is not statistically different from zero. Bhutta, on the other hand, reports about a 4 percent UAG-effect that is significant at the 5 percent level. If the control I use for GSE purchases from 1993 to 1995 does in fact reduce the negative bias in Bhutta's estimates, then the fact that my estimates are lower than his again suggests that my analysis is capturing purchases for which Bhutta does not account and which are not more heavily proportion of the population that is black, the proportion of the population that is Hispanic, and TM old . 
Results Table 5 reports all of the important coefficient estimates for this analysis. Column 1, with the bandwidth h = 0.20 and only the switcher dummy variable included in the regression, shows tracts switching into eligibility having 11.6 percent more GSE purchases than tracts that do not switch. Although the estimate is highly significant, the 22 I use the Census Population-based Tract Relationship File to determine the exact mapping of a 1990 Census tract to its 2000 Census equivalent and to determine which tracts to exclude. 23 This specification gives us the percentage change in GSE purchases. 24 To avoid collinearity with TM' i, old , the control TM old is not included in vector X i in regression (11).
large bandwidth and the low R-squared make it difficult to interpret the estimate as purely the UAG-effect. Column 2 includes tract-level housing and demographic controls and reduces the bandwidth to h = 0.05. The result is a much lower estimate of the UAGeffect, at about 2.6 percent, suggesting that tract characteristics have a large impact on the intensity of GSE purchasing activity. Column 3 also introduces an income control which measures just how strong the relative income fall into eligibility was for each tract. This regression allows us to conclude that the effect of just barely switching into eligibility is about a 5 percent increase in the number of GSE purchases.
However, looking at the coefficient on (TM' old )*(ΔD), we can also see that a unit increase in TM old , a tract's pre-switch relative income, results in more than 20 percent fewer mortgage purchases. In other words, the UAG-effect dissipates by 0.2074 of a percent for every hundredth of a unit that a switching tract's TM old was above 0.90, so that for a switcher whose TM old was about 1.15, the UAG-effect is zero. As we can see from Table 4 , the average switcher began with TM old = 1.0, suggesting that the UAG- My ability to capture GSE purchases of seasoned mortgages and mortgages not directly sold to them likely allows me to have a more precise estimate of the UAG effect.
This analysis also reveals that the GSEs purchased more in tracts whose TM stayed relatively stable than in tracts whose TM dropped significantly, implying that the UAG did not push the GSEs into tracts in serious economic decline. This conclusion is especially important given the fact that 2005-2006 saw the peak of the subprime mortgage market and that the goals have often been blamed for getting the GSEs deep into this market. If we consider high income variability as a proxy for high default risk and subprime status, this analysis gives reason to believe that the UAG was not responsible for the increased involvement of the GSEs in the subprime market, at least not through single-family mortgage purchases.
IV. Conclusion
The mortgage crisis prompted intense scrutiny of the GSEs with a particular focus on their mortgage purchases since the introduction of the AHGs in 1996. While the future of the GSEs and any governmental role in the housing finance system is now in question, it is plausible that the government may continue to encourage lending to low-income borrowers or borrowers in low-income areas. It is thus important to understand how to effectively target such lending. Studying the AHGs is a valuable and timely step in this direction. (2010) most likely because I am able to include purchases of seasoned mortgages and mortgages not directly sold to the GSEs in my analysis. Previous literature has not been able to assess the distribution of GSE purchases not captured by the HMDA dataset; using HUD's dataset, I conclude that these purchases are not more heavily concentrated in targeted tracts but instead are either distributed in a similar fashion to purchases contained in HMDA or are more heavily concentrated in untargeted tracts.
Since the UAG had such a small effect on GSE purchases in poor and underserved areas at the peak of the subprime mortgage market, I conclude that the goal and the GSEs' single-family mortgage purchases in these areas were not the drivers of the subprime market. Thinking about the UAG as a proxy for the AHGs as a whole, as is custom in the literature, I posit that single-family mortgage purchases made by the GSEs in response to the goals were not responsible for driving the increase in the number of high-risk borrowers in the mortgage market prior to the crisis.
Further research is required to understand the role played by the goals in spurring Note: Panels show GSE performance on goals (1) using only single-family mortgage purchases and (2) using all purchases (single-family, multi-family, REMICs, etc.) for which the GSEs can attain goal credit. Data Sources: FHFA, 2010 and the GSE Public Use Database. c Tract size controls include log owner-occupied units and log total housing units. Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, where the p-value is from a test of differences of means between switchers and non-switchers.
Standard deviation is in parentheses. (3)).
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